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Abstract
Complex behaviors are often driven by an internal model, which integrates sen-
sory information over time and facilitates long-term planning. Inferring the inter-
nal model is a crucial ingredient for interpreting neural activities of agents and is
beneficial for imitation learning. Here we describe a method to infer an agent’s
internal model and dynamic beliefs, and apply it to a simulated agent performing
a foraging task. We assume the agent behaves rationally according to their under-
standing of the task and the relevant causal variables that cannot be fully observed.
We model this rational solution as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Pro-
cess (POMDP). However, we allow that the agent may have wrong assumptions
about the task, and our method learns these assumptions from the agent’s actions.
Given the agent’s sensory observations and actions, we learn its internal model
by maximum likelihood estimation over a set of task-relevant parameters. The
Markov property of the POMDP enables us to characterize the transition proba-
bilities between internal states and iteratively estimate the agent’s policy using a
constrained Expectation-Maximization(EM) algorithm. We validate our method
on simulated agents performing suboptimally on a foraging task, and successfully
recover the agent’s actual model.
1 Introduction
In an uncertain and partially observable environment, animals learn to plan and act based on their
limited sensory information. To better understand these natural behaviors and interpret their neural
mechanisms, it would be beneficial to estimate the internal model that explains animals’ behavioral
strategies. In this paper, we use Partially Observed Markov Decision Processes (POMDP) to model
animals as rational agents acting under possibly incorrect assumptions about the world. We then
solve an inverse POMDP problem to infer these internal assumptions, and estimate the dynamics of
internal beliefs.
We use an agent’s actions to learn its internal model for the world. This model includes its assumed
stochastic dynamics of the partially observable world variables and the agent’s subjective assessment
of rewards and costs. Other past efforts have addressed reduced versions of this problem, either
solving parts of the problem like learning dynamics or subjective rewards, or assuming a fully
observable environment. Our work solves all of these problems together.
Preprint. Work in progress.
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At the highest level, by positing a rational but possibly mistaken agent, our approach is closest to a
Bayesian Theory of Mind (BToM) [1; 2; 3; 4]. Previous work assumed static latent variables that
were unknown until fully observed [4]; we allow for dynamic latent variable and partial observabil-
ity. Some of this earlier work used simpler trial-structured tasks like perceptual decision-making
[1; 2], whereas our method can infer models that agents use to make long-term plans and choose
sequences of actions. Our approach learns both stochastic dynamics and subjective reward func-
tions simultaneously, whereas prior work in BToM learned only subjective rewards [4]. Other work
[5] inferred beliefs, whereas we infer both dynamic beliefs and the internal model that gave rise to
those dynamics. Finally, [4] used a brute force grid search to find the best fitting model, whereas we
provide a general probabilistic prescription for learning a POMDP agent model using Expectation
Maximization, including an analytic expression for the objective function gradient.
Other well-known inverse problems address parts of our Inverse POMDP. Inverse Reinforcement
Learning (IRL) tackles the problem of learning how an agent judges rewards and costs based on
observed actions [6], but assumes a known dynamics model [7; 8]. Conversely, Inverse Optimal
Control (IOC) learns the agent’s internal model for the world dynamics [9] and observations [10],
but assumes the reward functions. In [11; 12] both reward function and dynamics were learned,
but only the fully-observed MDP case is explored, whereas we solve the more difficult partially-
observed case.
To solve our Inverse POMDP problem, we cast it as a maximum-likelihood optimization where the
reward functions and latent stochastic dynamics can be learned with gradient descent methods [8]
to identify the parameters that best explain the animal behaviors under a known model-based task
structure. We use the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm [13], specifically the Baum-Welch
algorithm, to estimate the parameters of the internal model, and infer the posterior of the latent
states.
Our method should serve as a valuable tool for creating interpretable models for real agents per-
forming tasks with natural features. To demonstrate our approach, we apply it to an ecologically
relevant foraging task that requires sensitivity to past rewards, current observations, and an internal
memory state. Our Inverse POMDP estimation procedure is conceptually simple and should scale
up to larger problems.
In Section 2, we define the task structure as a general POMDP, and represent an agent’s solution of
this task using a Belief MDP (a Markov Decision Process over belief states). The method to infer
the internal model is explained in Section 3. We next applied our method to a naturalistic foraging
task that we define in Section 4. Results of these numerical experiments are shown in Section 5,
followed by a brief discussion.
2 Behavioral modeling
There is a one-to-one correspondence between a POMDP and an MDP operating on the space of
beliefs (a Belief MDP). By using this equivalence, we are able to define belief states and their
dynamics, and further to compute the rational policy by which an artificial agent chooses actions,
given its reward function and action costs.
2.1 Modeling behavior as a POMDP
In a POMDP, since the world is not fully observed, the agent must create an internal representation
of latent states in the world. Identifying the content of such an internal representation will help
to identity how these task-relevant variables are encoded in neural responses. Instead of solving
directly for the POMDP, we use the mapping between POMDP and a Belief Markov Decision Pro-
cesses (Belief MDP) to solve for the policies that describe the best actions for the animal’s internal
model.
In a POMDP in discrete time, the state of the world, s, follows dynamics described by transition
probability T (s′, s, a) = P (s′|s, a), where s′ is the new state, s is the current state, and a is the
action selected by an agent. However, the agent does not have direct access to the world state s, but
must infer it from measurements o. The sensory information for the agent depends on the action
and the world state following probability distribution P (o|s, a). Upon taking action a, the agent
receives an immediate reward r = R(s′, s, a). The goal of an agent solving a POMDP is to choose
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actions that maximize the long-term expected reward E[
∑∞
t=0 γ
trt] based on a temporal discount
factor 0 < γ < 1. The policy pi(a|s) describes the probability of choosing an action from a certain
state s. We use the “state-action value”, Qpi(s, a), to quantify how much total future reward can be
obtained by taking action a from state s and then following a particular policy pi from subsequent
states. This value function under optimal policy pi∗ can be expressed in a recursive form using the
Bellman equation [14]:
Qpi∗(s, a) =
∑
s′
P (s′|s, a)
[
R(s′, s, a) + γmax
a′
Qpi∗(s
′, a′)
]
(1)
where γ is the temporal discount factor, and R(s′, s, a) is the instantaneous net reward for taking
action a from state s and reaching state s′.
2.2 Belief MDP
In a partially observable environment, an agent can only act on the basis of past actions and obser-
vations. The concept of belief, which is a posterior distribution over world states s given sensory
information, concisely summarizes the information that can be used by agents during decision mak-
ing. Mathematically, we write the belief b as a vector with length equal to the number of states. The
i-th element of the belief vector bi is the probability that the current state at time t is s = i given the
sensory information until now,
bit = P (st = i|o1:t) (2)
The belief state representation allows a POMDP problem to be mapped onto an MDP problem with
fully observable states. Here the state is now a belief state instead of true world state, and the process
is known as a Belief MDP. Correspondingly, the state-action value function can be defined on belief
states as Qpi(b, a), with the world state s replaced by the belief state b. The policy pi in this case
describes the strategy of an agent, which is a mapping from the belief state to actions.
In a Belief MDP, the belief state is a probability distribution and thus takes on continuous values.
To make the problem more tractable, we discretize the belief space. This will allow us to solve the
belief MDP problem with standard MDP algorithms [14; 15].
3 Internal model inference
The dynamics of the belief states and the policy are dependent on a set of parameters θ. In our
setting, these are presumed by the agent to relate to the task setting, but may be incorrect. Inferring
the agent’s parameters θ enables us to better understand the internal model of the agents that explains
the behavior, and further infer the latent belief of the agent. This can be viewed as a maximum
likelihood estimation problem. Due to the Markov property of the belief MDP model, this estimation
problem can be analyzed using a hidden Markov model (HMM) where the belief state is a latent
variable.
3.1 EM algorithm for inverse POMDP
The EM algorithm [13] enables us to solve for the parameters that give best explanation of the
observed data, while inferring unobserved states in the model. Denote by l(θ) the likelihood of
the observed data, where θ are the parameters of the model which include both assumptions about
the world dynamics and the parameters determining the sizes of rewards and action costs. We
alternately update the parameters θ that improve the expected complete-data log-likelihood and
the posterior over latent states based on the estimated parameter. Let b be the vector of beliefs,
which is the latent variable in our belief MDP model, and let a and o be the vector of actions
and sensory information over time. The sub-index of the variables 1 : t means the data sample is
from time 1 to t. According to the EM algorithm, in the E-step the estimated parameters θold from
the previous iteration determine the posterior distribution of the latent variable given the observed
data Pθold(b|a1:T ,o1:T ). In the M-step, the observed data log-likelihood function to be maximized
reduces to
l(θ) = Q(θ,θold) +H(Pθold(b|a1:T ,o1:T )). (3)
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To be consistent with [16], we use Q(θ,θold) as the auxiliary function that describes the expected
complete data likelihood, and H(·) is the entropy of the posterior of the latent variable.1
During iterations of EM algorithm, the value of the log-likelihood l(θ) always increases to a (possi-
bly local) maximum. Within the M-step, with fixed parameters θold from the previous iteration, the
entropy of the latent state H(Pθold(b|a1:T ,o1:T )) is fixed. As a result, we need to update parameter
θ that maximizes function Q(θ,θold) in the new iteration.
For the Belief MDP, the expected complete data log likelihood Q(θ,θold) can be decomposed into
transition probabilities and policies at each time due to the Markov property. The Q-auxiliary func-
tion can therefore be expressed as:
Q(θ,θold) = 〈logPθ(b1:T ,a1:T ,o1:T )〉Pθold (b1:T |a1:T ,o1:T ) (4)
=
∑
i
Pθold(b0 = i|a1:T ,o1:T ) logPθ(b0 = i)
+
∑
t
∑
i,j
[
Pθold(bt = i, bt+1 = j|a1:T ,o1:T ) logPθ(bt+1 = j, ot+1|bt = i, ot, at)
]
+
∑
t
∑
i
[
Pθold(bt = i|a1:T ,o1:T ) logPθ(at|bt = i, ot)
]
Since we have discussed the belief state in the belief MDP. From hereon, we will use belief state b to
replace the general state s in the transition probabilities and policies. Since the policy and transition
probability depend implicitly on the parameters θ, we are unable to get a closed form of optimal
solution for θ. Instead of solving for the optimal θ, we use gradient descent to update the parameter
θ in the M-step. In (4), the terms Pθ(bt+1 = j, ot+1|bt = i, ot, at) depend only on the parameters
describing the bayesian update for the state dynamics and the agent’s uncertainty about it, while the
policy terms Pθ(at|bt = i, ot) depend on both the dynamic parameters and reward functions. To
perform gradient descent, we need to take the gradient of these terms with respect to the parameters
θ.
3.2 Derivatives of policy
When the policy is optimal, the term Pθ(at|bt = i, ot) is a delta function, so the derivative of the
policy does not exist. As a result, we approximate the optimal policy using a softmax or Boltzmann
policy with a small learnable temperature τ . The softmax introduces an additional sub-optimality
of the agent: instead of choosing the action that brings the maximal expected reward, the agent has
some chance of choosing a reward that yields a lesser reward, depending on the state-action value
Q. Under the softmax policy, the actions under belief state b follow the distribution
pisfm(a|b) = Pθ(a|b) ∼ e
Qpisfm (b,a)/τ∑
a′
eQpisfm (b,a
′)/τ . (5)
If we can calculate the derivative of the Q-value function with respect to the parameter set θ, we are
able to get the policy derivatives. Similarly to the Bellman equation (1) based on the optimal policy,
the Q-value function under a softmax policy can also be expressed in a recursive way, replacing the
max with an average:
Qpisfm(b, a) =
∑
b′
P (b′|b, a)
[
R(b′, b, a) + γ
∑
a′
pisfm(a
′|b′)Qpisfm(b′, a′)
]
(6)
For simplicity, we omit the temporal subindices in the following derivation. Denote the vectorized
version of Q(b, a) and pi(a|b) as QV and piV . Differentiating with respect to θi ∈ θ on both sides
gives us:
∂QV
∂θi
= cVi + γΓ(P (b
′|b, a))
(
Diag(QV )
∂piV
∂QV
+ Diag(piV )
)∂QV
∂θi
(7)
1Unfortunately, the conventional notations in EM and reinforcement learning collide here, both using the
same letter: thisQ(θ,θold) auxiliary function is different from theQ-value function in the MDP model, and is
denoted in the Calligraphic font.
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where cVi is a vectorized version of the matrix ci(b, a) with
ci(b, a) =
∑
b′
∂P (b′|b, a)
∂θi
[
R(b′, b, a) + γ
∑
a′
pi(a′|b′)Q(b′, a′)
]
+
∑
b′
P (b′|b, a)∂R(b
′, b, a)
∂θi
(8)
and Γ(P (b′|b, a)) is a function containing repeated blocks of the transition probabilities P (b′|b, a).
The detailed derivation is given in the Supplementary Material.
By reorganizing equation (7), we can see that the derivative of the Q-value function with respect to
the parameters can be solved analytically as a linear function of the known quantities. Using the
chain rule, the gradient of the policy can be obtained in this way. We then use this gradient in the M
step of the Expectation-Maximization algorithm to estimate the internal model parameters that best
explain the observed data.
4 Application to foraging
We applied our method to the specific setting of a task in which an animal can forage at either of
two locations (‘feeding boxes’) which may have hidden food rewards that appear with a certain rate.
A few discrete actions are available to the animal: it can open a box to get reward or observe its
absence, go to the other box, or stay in a certain place.
To define the Belief MDP for this ‘two-box’ task, we need to define the states, actions and rewards.
The states must represent the agent’s location, whether it has obtained food from the boxes, and also
whether food is available in each box. Since the agent knows its location exactly, and knows whether
it has obtained food, we only need a belief representation for the unobserved food availability in each
box.
We assume there are three possible locations for the agent: the positions of boxes 1 and 2, and a
middle location 0. The actions are defined in a mutually exclusive way as: doing nothing, going
to location 0/1/2, and pressing a button on the closest box to retrieve food (if available). Each
action has an associated cost, such as the traveling cost, and the button pressing cost. This cost
disincentivizes the agent from rapidly repeating actions that might access reward. We also include
a small ‘grooming’ reward for staying at the middle location 0 to encourage the agent to stop and
think.
In addition to the cost of actions, there are several parameters that are related to the experiment
setting. The food availability in each box follows a telegraph process: the food becomes available
following a Poisson process with rate γ, and then becomes unavailable following another Poisson
process with a different transition rate . We assume the agent knows these dynamics, but may
mistakenly assume different values for the transition rates. Let Ai,t ∈ {0, 1} be the food availability
for box i ∈ {1, 2} at time t. By omitting the box index i, we now consider the dynamics of
food availability at a specific box. When the animal takes no action, denoted by a = ∅, the food
availability transitions according to p(At+1|At, a = ∅):
At
0 1
At+1 0 1− γ 
1 γ 1− 
(9)
where γ and  are food appearing and disappearing rate, indicating the probability that food becomes
available or unavailable.
For a single box, the belief dynamics has the form bt+1 = Tbt, where T is the transition matrix,
and b contains two elements b1t = P (At = 1|o1:t, a1:t) and b0t = P (At = 0|o1:t, a1:t). Since the
availability is binary, b1t = 1− b0t , we only need to track b1t . According to the box dynamics (9),
b1t+1 = γ + (1− − γ)b1t (10)
In a Belief MDP, the belief state is a probability distribution over the unknown world states s ∈ S,
and if there are |S| possible values then the beliefs states take on continuous values in an |S| − 1-
dimensional simplex. For computational tractability, we discretize beliefs in each box into N states.
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This is sensible also computationally, since it is unlikely that an animal will maintain arbitrary
precision about its uncertainty: it is difficult to distinguish between 70% and 80% confidence.
We then define the transition matrix in the discretized belief space by binning the transition matrix,
integrating the transition probabilities for the continuous belief space within a given bin (Figure 1).
To approximate this length, we assume a multivariate Gaussian distribution with mean at the center
of each bin. The probability at the point, which is the orthogonal projection of the center point onto
the dynamic line, reflects the length of the red line shown in (Figure 1). By adjusting the covariance
of the multivariate Gaussian distribution, we control the diffusion between neighboring bins, which
reflects additional belief stochasticity.
q’+dq’
q’
b’
b–
q
lL
q+dqb
b+
Figure 1: Quantization of deterministic relationship between bt = b and bt+1 = b′ within a bin
b ∈ [q, q+dq] and b′ ∈ [q′, q′+dq′]. The diagonal line reflects the deterministic transition probability
P (b′|b) for the continuous belief space, which is a deterministic function. The mass within a bin on
belief space is proportional to the length l of the red line. This length l can be approximated with the
probability density of a two-dimensional multivariate Gaussian distribution with mean at the center
of the bin.
When a button-press action is taken to open a box, any available reward there is acquired. Af-
terwards, the animal knows there is no more food available now in the box (since it was either
unavailable or consumed) and the belief is reset to zero.
With the transition matrices and reward functions for different actions for the internal model, the
animal has an optimal policy that is based on the value of different actions. To allow for variability
of actions, we assume that the animal uses a softmax policy (5).
5 Experiments
We now apply the learning method for solving an inverse POMDP (Section 3) to the foraging task
(Section 4). The goal is to estimate a simulated agent’s internal model and belief dynamics from its
sensory observations and chosen actions.
For simplicity we assume that reward availability at both boxes follows a telegraph process with the
same appearance probability of γ1 = γ2 = 0.1 and disappearance probability of 1 = 2 = .01,
per discrete time step. Although here the two boxes have identical dynamics, our model estimation
algorithm will also work in cases where the two boxes have different dynamics.
Without loss of generality, we measure gains and losses compared to the food reward at one box,
thus defining the reward as r = 1. In that currency, the cost (negative reward) of pressing the button
is 0.3, and that of traveling is 0.2 (switching between boxes requires two steps for a total cost of 0.4).
We also allow a small reward for waiting of r = 0.05 at the center location (e.g. while grooming).
We assume the action of an agent taking optimal strategy is determined rationally according to the
value function (1) in belief state space. In Figure 2A, we show some properties of the value function
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under the optimal solution of this task given the agent’s incorrect assumptions. Qualitatively, we see
that the policy of the agent is to go to the box that has higher expected value, consistent with our
intuition. Figure 2B shows the same value functions based on the internal model that we estimate
by our method.
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Figure 2: Visualization of real and inferred value functions. A: Values of different actions and states
under the optimal solution of the two-box task, when the agent starts between the two boxes and
has specific beliefs (subjective probability) about whether reward is available at each box. Left: The
value difference (colors) between the actions ‘stay’ and ‘go’. When the belief in food availability
at either box 1 or 2 is high, the value of ‘go’ is higher than that of ‘stay’, and the animal chooses
to go. Right: The optimal agent places a higher value on the box where the belief in available food
is highest. B: Values of different actions and states based on inferred internal model, under optimal
solution.
To allow for variability in action selection, we create an agent that uses a softmax policy (5) with
temperature τ = 0.2. This small temperature enables the agent to follow an approximately optimal
policy based on state-action value Q(b, a).
The actions and sensory evidence (locations and rewards) obtained by the agent all constitute obser-
vations for the experimenter’s learning of the agent’s internal model. Based on these observations
over time, we use the EM algorithm to infer the parameters of the internal model that can best ex-
plain the behavioral data.We track the agent’s actions and sensory observations over T = 5000 time
points. In Figure 3, we show an example of the task data. When the animal pushes the button and
opens the box at a time when there is food in the box, the food is acquired; when there is no food
available at that time, the animal receives no reward. The animal may travel between the two boxes
to maximize the expected future reward; it may also stay at a certain place whenever beneficial.
box 1
box 2
location 1
travel
open box:
reward
open box:
nothing
travel
 location 2
reward:
  available
  not
time
location 0
Figure 3: An example of task data. The reward availability in each of two boxes evolves according
to a telegraph process, switching between available (cyan) and unavailable (red), and the animal
may travel between the locations of the two boxes. When the box is opened, if there is food in it, the
reward is obtained; otherwise, there is no reward.
In Figure 4, we show the results for inference based on a typical set of data. With EM algorithm,
we are able to solve for the parameters that have the largest likelihood given the observations. The
comparison between the true parameters and the estimated parameters are shown in table 1. Rates
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are expressed as event probabilities for one discrete time bin. Rewards (and negative costs) are
expressed in units of food rewards.
Table 1: Comparison of True and Estimated Parameters.
Parameter θ true est.
Food Appearance rate (box 1) γ1 0.1 0.12
Food Appearance rate (box 2) γ2 0.1 0.13
Food Disappearance rate (box 1) 1 0.01 0.0077
Food Disappearance rate (box 2) 2 0.01 0.012
Grooming reward Rgroom 0.05 0.036
Traveling reward Rgo −0.2 −0.21
Pushing button reward Rpush −0.3 −0.44
Due to the limited amount of data, there is discrepancy between the true parameters and the esti-
mated parameters. This discrepancy can be reduced with larger amount of data. With the estimated
parameters, we are able to infer dynamics of the posterior over the latent states, which are the beliefs
on the two boxes. Note that this is an experimenter’s posterior over the agent’s subjective posterior.
The inferred posteriors have similar dynamics as the true latent belief states. Consistent with the
true probability of the food availability in each box according to the underlying telegraph process,
the inferred posteriors exhibit exponentially shaped time series.
−0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
uθ
−0.4
−0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
vθ
Log likelihood of observed data
−10807
−9987
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−7527
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estimated
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
1
Inferred posterior over belief on box 1
0 5 10 15 20 250
1
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
time
dis
cr
et
ize
d 
be
lie
f
actual belief
Inferred posterior over belief on box 2
A B
Figure 4: Inference of parameters of the internal model and the posterior over the latent belief states.
A: The estimated parameters converge to the optimal point of the log-likelihood contour. Since the
parameter space has high dimensions, we project them onto the first two principal components of
the trajectory. B: Inferred posterior of the latent states. The greyscale indicates the probability over
the possible beliefs, and the red dots are the true belief states of the agent over time. The posteriors
are consistent with the the dynamics of the true beliefs.
Since our inferred model parameters differ slightly from the agent’s true parameters, we examine
how those two internal models differ. Based on the estimated parameters, we therefore create another
simulated agent using the inferred internal model. Under the optimal policy for the given model,
the new agent reveals a similar Q-value function. Figure 2 shows that starting from the middle
location, both agents have almost the same preferences of actions under the different belief states.
Figure 5 shows that under softmax near-optimal policies, the two agents choose actions with similar
frequencies, occupy the three locations for the same fraction of time, and wait similar amounts of
time between pushing buttons or travelling. This demonstrates that our estimated agent’s internal
model generates behaviors that are consistent with behaviors of the agent from which it learned.
6 Conclusions
We presented a method to infer the internal model of a rational agent who collects rewards in a
task by following a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process. Given that an agent chooses
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Figure 5: Comparing statistics of behaviors for the actual agent and the inferred agent. A: The
distribution of actions. B: The distribution of time staying at each location. C: The distribution of
time intervals between two button pressing actions. D: The distribution of time intervals between
traveling actions.
actions in this way, the estimation of its internal model parameters can be formulated as a maximum
likelihood problem, and the parameters can be inferred using the EM algorithm. When we applied
our method to a foraging task, experiments showed that the parameters that best explain the behavior
of the agent nicely matched the internal parameters of that agent. The estimated internal model and
the true internal model produced similar value functions and behavioral statistics.
Our framework is quite general, and can be applied to still more complex tasks. It can be used to
infer false beliefs derived from incorrect or incomplete knowledge of task parameters. It can also be
used to infer incorrect structure within a given model class. For example, it is natural for animals
to assume that some aspects of the world, such as reward rates at different locations, is not fixed,
even if an experiment uses fixed rates [17]. Similarly, an agent may have a superstition that different
reward sources are correlated even when the true process is independent. Given a model class that
includes such counterfactual relationships between task variables, our method can test whether an
agent holds these incorrect assumptions.
The success of our method on simulated agents suggests our method could be fruitfully applied to
experimental data from real animals performing such foraging tasks [18]. Accurate estimation of
dynamic belief states will provide useful targets for interpreting dynamic neural activity patterns,
which could help identity the neural substrates of task-relevant thoughts.
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Supplementary
In the EM algorithm, our M step follows the gradient of the expected complete data log-likelihood
to find the optimal parameters θ. Recall that the expected complete data log-likelihood can be
expressed with the Q-auxiliary function as
Q(θ,θold) = 〈logPθ(b1:T ,a1:T ,o1:T )〉Pθold (b1:T |a1:T ,o1:T ) (S1)
=
∑
i
Pθold(b0 = i|a1:T ,o1:T ) logPθ(b0 = i)
+
∑
t
∑
i,j
[
Pθold(bt = i, bt+1 = j|a1:T ,o1:T ) logPθ(bt+1 = j, ot+1|bt = i, ot, at)
]
+
∑
t
∑
i
[
Pθold(bt = i|a1:T ,o1:T ) logPθ(at|bt = i, ot)
]
The first term reflects the initial belief distribution, and it has a negligible contribution to Q when
there are many time points t. The derivative of the other terms of the Q-auxiliary function with
respect to the parameters is
∂Q(θ,θold)
∂θ
=
∑
t
∑
i,j
[
Pθold(bt = i, bt+1 = j|a1:T ,o1:T )
∂ logPθ(bt+1 = j, ot+1|bt = i, ot, at)
∂θ
]
(S2)
+
∑
t
∑
i
[
Pθold(bt = i|a1:T ,o1:T )
∂ logPθ(at|bt = i, ot)
∂θ
]
(S3)
In (S2), the transition probability Pθ(bt+1 = j, ot+1|bt = i, ot, at) is a function of the dynamics
parameters, while in (S3), the policy term Pθ(at|bt = i, ot) is a function of both the dynamic
parameters and the rewards. Since the transition probability is a matrix whose elements are functions
of the dynamics parameters, the derivative can be taken element-wise. The derivative of the policy
can be derived with the recursive Q value function, as shown below.
Under a softmax policy pisfm ∝ eQ(b,a)/τ , the Q value function for belief state-action pairs satisfies
Qpisfm(b, a) =
∑
b′
P (b′|b, a)
[
R(b′, b, a) + γ
∑
a′
pisfm(a
′|b′)Qpisfm(b′, a′)
]
(S4)
Consider now a specific element θi of the parameter vector θ. For a particular (b, a) pair, taking the
derivative of both sides with respect to θi, we have
∂Qpisfm(b, a)
∂θi
=
∑
b′
∂P (b′|b, a)
∂θi
[
R(b′, b, a) + γ
∑
a′
pisfm(a
′|b′)Qpisfm(b′, a′)
]
(S5)
+
∑
b′
P (b′|b, a)∂R(b
′, b, a)
∂θi
(S6)
+
∑
b′
P (b′|b, a)γ
∑
a′
∂pisfm(a
′|b′)
∂θi
Qpisfm(b
′, a′) (S7)
+
∑
b′
P (b′|b, a)γ
∑
a′
pisfm(a
′|b′)∂Qpisfm(b
′, a′)
∂θi
(S8)
Note here
∂Qpisfm(b, a)
∂θi
is a scalar. We define ci as the sum of the first two lines (S5–S6):
ci(b, a) =
∑
b′
∂P (b′|b, a)
∂θi
[
R(b′, b, a) + γ
∑
a′
pisfm(a
′|b′)Qpisfm(b′, a′)
]
+
∑
b′
P (b′|b, a)∂R(b
′, b, a)
∂θi
(S9)
1
With this substitution we have
∂Qpisfm(b, a)
∂θi
= ci(b, a) + γ
∑
b′
P (b′|b, a)
∑
a′
[∂pisfm(a′|b′)
∂θi
Qpisfm(b
′, a′)
+ pisfm(a
′|b′)∂Qpisfm(b
′, a′)
∂θi
]
(S10)
The softmax policy is pisfm(a|b) = Pθ(a|b) ∼ e
Qpisfm (b,a)/τ∑
a′
eQpisfm (b,a
′)/τ , thus
∂pisfm(a|b)
∂θi
=
∂pisfm(a|b)
∂Qpisfm(b, a)
∂Qpisfm(b, a)
∂θi
+
∑
a′ 6=a
∂pisfm(a|b)
∂Qpisfm(b, a
′)
∂Qpisfm(b, a
′)
∂θi
(S11)
Suppose there are B distinct belief states, and A actions. If we vectorize the matrices Qpisfm(b, a)
, pisfm(a|b) and ci(b, a) over these discrete belief states and actions, denoting them as QVpisfm , piVsfm
and cVi respectively, then these are vector with length BA. (S10) can then be rewritten as a linear
function
...
∂QVpisfm
∂θi
...
 =

...
cVi
...
+ γ

...
...
...
P (b′|b, a) P (b′|b, a) P (b′|b, a)
...
...
...

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ(P (b′|b,a))
(
. . .
QVpisfm
. . .


...
∂piVsfm
∂QVpisfm
...
+

. . .
piVsfm
. . .

)
...
∂QVpisfm
∂θi
...
 ,
where

...
∂QVpisfm
∂θi
...
 is a BA × 1 vector,

...
∂piVsfm
∂QVpisfm
...
 is a BA × BA matrix, and

. . .
QVpisfm
. . .

and

. . .
piVsfm
. . .
 are diagonal matrices with vectors QVpisfm and piVsfm along the diagonal. The
derivative of Q with respect to the parameter θi can then be solved as
...
∂QVpisfm
∂θi
...
 =
(
I − γΓ(P (b′|b, a))
(
. . .
QVpisfm
. . .


...
∂piVsfm
∂QVpisfm
...
+

. . .
piVsfm
. . .
)
)−1 
...
cVi
...

(S12)
Without the brackets indicating the matrix shapes, finally we obtain
∂QVpisfm
∂θi
=
(
I − γΓ
(
Diag(QVpisfm)
∂piVsfm
∂QVpisfm
+Diag(piVsfm)
))−1
cVi (S13)
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